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E-mail address: olaf.blanke@epﬂ.ch (O. Blanke).People tend to grossly overestimate the size of their mirror-reﬂected face. Although this
overestimation bias is robust, not much is known about its relationships to self-face per-
ception. In two experiments, we investigated the overestimation bias as a function of the
presentation of the own face (left–right reversed – as in a mirror – or nonreversed – as
in a photograph), the identity of the seen face, and prior exposure to a real mirror. For this
we developed a computerized task requiring size estimations of displayed faces. We repli-
cated the observation that people overestimate the size of their mirror-reﬂected face and
showed that the overestimation can be reduced following a brief mirror exposure. We also
found that left–right reversal modulates the overestimation bias, depending on the per-
ceived face’s identity. These data underline the enhanced familiarity of left–right reversed
self-faces and the importance of size perception for understanding mirror reﬂection
processing.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
To most people, the fact that the reﬂection of one’s own face on the surface of a mirror is physically half the size of one’s
actual face size (half the width and half the height, hence a quarter of one’s actual face surface), is deeply counterintuitive
(Gombrich, 1960; Parks, 2001). Moreover, this is true regardless of the distance between observer and mirror. During self-
perception in a mirror, observer and visual target are one and the same. Hence, the mirror surface, acting like a virtual win-
dow, always stands midway between the eye of the observer and the location where his or her reﬂection appears to stand in
the virtual space ‘‘behind’’ the mirror (see Fig. 1A). It follows that the projection of one’s own face on the surface of the mirror
is necessarily half the size of one’s actual face, regardless of distance. That most people tend to overlook this fact has been
shown in several recent experiments. When asked to quantify the size of their mirror reﬂection, participants tend to over-
estimate the size of their reﬂected face, i.e. they incorrectly estimate the size of their face’s reﬂection as closer to the size of
their physical face than to the correct size of 50% of their physical face (Bertamini & Parks, 2005; Lawson & Bertamini, 2006;
Lawson, Bertamini, & Liu, 2007).
This overestimation bias has been interpreted as a combination of perceptual factors and cognitive factors. Our strong
inbuilt capacity for perceiving size constancy seems to hamper our capacity to correctly perceive the size of a reﬂection
as opposed to the actual size of the object being reﬂected. For instance, seeing a tree through the window provides an imme-
diate idea of the tree’s size, not the surface its projection occupies on the window plane. Accordingly, it has been proposed. All rights reserved.
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Fig. 1. Overestimation bias of the reﬂected face and stimuli. (a) The projection of the reﬂected face on the surface of a mirror is half the size of one’s actual
face. In front of a mirror (left panel), use stickers to delimitate the visible top and bottom of your face (middle panel). You can then measure the height of the
resulting space, through which the entirety of your face can still be seen in the mirror, and compare it to the actual height of your face (right panel; for more
details, see Bertamini and Parks, 2005). (b) Sample of the stimuli produced for experiments 1 and 2. The upper row shows normal-oriented stimuli (as in a
photograph), the lower row shows left–right reversed stimuli (i.e. as people perceive themselves in a mirror). For each stimulus, participants were asked to
respond whether the displayed face is bigger or smaller than the face they would see in a mirror. Note that all face stimuli are aligned with the participant’s
head at eye level.
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son, & Liu, 2008; Lawson et al., 2007). Hence, the size of the image projected on the mirror tends to be overestimated as it is
automatically ‘‘regressed’’ (Thouless, 1931) to the size of the physical object being reﬂected. However, a range of experi-
ments, while conﬁrming the robustness of the overestimation bias, showed that the magnitude of the bias can at least be
decreased by different factors, such as allowing participants to look at a real mirror while judging the size of their reﬂected
face or asking them to estimate the size of a reﬂected face-sized ellipse instead of their own face (Lawson & Bertamini, 2006).
Based on these observations, Lawson and Bertamini (2006) suggested a mixed-account of the size overestimation bias. Its
persistence in conditions where one’s reﬂection could directly be seen in a real mirror strongly suggests a perceptual account
(i.e. our tendency to interpret 2D planar surfaces as 3D environments), yet the fact that the bias can be modulated in speciﬁc
conditions suggests an inﬂuence of cognitive factors, such as naïve beliefs and expectations about mirrors and familiarity
with the standard size of the reﬂected object the projected size of which has to be estimated.
The relevance of these empirical observations on mirror perception to studies of self-face recognition has remained unex-
plored. This is despite the fact that self-face stimuli have often been used in recent years in the cognitive neurosciences. In-
deed, behavioral and neuroimaging studies aiming at understanding the brain mechanisms of self-face recognition in
humans have increased recently, but yielded conﬂicting results (see reviews in Devue & Brédart, 2011; Gillihan & Farah,
2005; Legrand & Ruby, 2009). Part of the explanation for such divergent ﬁndings may lie in methodological variations, such
as the choice of faces used as comparison to the own face. For instance, as one’s own face is a highly familiar face, likely due
to frequent mirror exposure (Tong & Nakayama, 1999), it is important to control for such familiarity by comparing perfor-
mance of the self face with other familiar faces, such as the face of a friend, co-worker or celebrity. Another confounding
factor in studies of self-face recognition is the presentation of the self-face stimulus. It is a seldom-mentioned fact that
the own face, unlike other people’s faces, cannot be perceived directly, and it is only since the development of quality mirrors
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also via photography and other technologies). Yet mirrors provide a self-image different from the image other persons form
of oneself in one important respect: it is left–right reversed. This is not a trivial point: besides the fact that numerous think-
ers have pondered on the origin and nature of this peculiarity of mirrors (e.g. Gregory, 1997; Navon, 1987; Takano & Tanaka,
2007), studies have shown that people perceive their mirror-reversed face as more familiar than their ‘‘normally oriented’’
face, and conversely for the face of a familiar person (Mita, Dermer, & Knight, 1977; Rhodes, 1986). This was further con-
ﬁrmed by studies showing that humans are better at detecting asymmetrically located features for their own face, while
such features are less important when judging the orientation of the face of a familiar other person (Brédart, 2003). However,
previous work on self-face recognition has not studied the impact of these documented differences regarding the orientation
of self-faces. Therefore, it remains to be shown how left–right orientation of one’s own face can inﬂuence self-face percep-
tion, especially in comparison to other familiar faces, which are much less likely to be known in reversed orientation.
In order to better understand the principles underlying visual self-face recognition, it is therefore important to examine
the reﬂected face overestimation bias and the effects of mirror reversal. These factors have not been controlled in most
behavioral and neuroimaging studies involving self-face recognition, despite the fact that other studies have shown their
importance in visual cognition. Moreover, left–right reversal and reﬂected face overestimations have never been investigated
in the same study.
In two experiments, we conjointly explored the reversal and size factors of mirrored self-perception in a new exper-
imental paradigm. We show that left–right reversal affects judgments of the size of one’s own reﬂected face. Because
self-recognition per se was irrelevant to the present task (which required fast responses in a two-alternative forced-
choice and randomized design, where left–right reversal should a priori have no inﬂuence on performance) our results
point to an implicit effect of left–right reversal in face processing that depends on whether the own or another person’s
face is shown.2. Experiment 1
In experiment 1, we investigated the effect of face orientation (mirror reversed versus nonreversed) on the size overes-
timation bias of mirror reﬂections. Participants were asked to perform a size estimation task of faces shown on a computer
screen, while imagining they were looking at a mirror rather than a screen. Crucially, face orientation was irrelevant to the
task and participants were not informed about the presence of differently orientated stimuli.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Sixteen healthy participants (four female and 12 male, two left-handed) took part in experiment 1 (mean age ± SD:
26.8 ± 3.2 years). All of them had normal vision and none reported a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. Informed
consent was obtained from all participants prior to their inclusion in the study. They received ﬁnancial compensation for
their participation.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Color pictures of each participant were taken using a digital camera (BenQ C1220, 12MP, Taiwan) a few days prior to the
experimental session. For the picture, participants were asked to insert their head through a hole cut in a green cloth in order
to get a uniform background color and were asked to keep a neutral facial expression. Uniform lighting was obtained with a
front facing neon lighting. Pictures were then digitally formatted with a gray background and matched luminance for back-
ground and face. For each participant a set of 25 images ranging from 30% to 150% (in steps of 5%) of the actual head size
(obtained for each participant by measuring the length from the chin to the top of head with a ruler: mean 23 cm ± 2 cm)
was created. A further set was created by using the same 25 pictures and left–right reversing them (Fig. 1B). We selected
this range of sizes on the basis of pilot experiments in order to obtain a comparable amount of images judged as being ‘‘big-
ger’’ or ‘‘smaller’’ than the participant’s mirror-reﬂected face would be.
Participants sat on a chair in a dark room with their eyes at a distance of 80 cm from a vertically adjusted monitor (HP,
23 inches, 1200  1920 pixels resolution, LCD, USA). Chair height and chin-rest were adjusted individually so that the sub-
ject’s eyes were at mid-screen height and aligned vertically with the eyes of the stimuli (which remained constant through-
out the experiment, regardless of size or orientation). Prior to each stimulus presentation, a white ﬁxation cross (on a black
background) was displayed for 500 ms. This was followed by a 180-ms long presentation of one of the 50 stimuli. A black
screen was then immediately displayed until the participant responded. In each of ﬁve experimental blocks, each image ap-
peared twice in normal orientation, and twice in mirror-reversed orientation (25  2  2 = 100 presentations per block).
Thus, each stimulus was presented 10 times leading to a total of 500 stimulus trials. All images within one block were pre-
sented in random order. A training period of ten trials preceded the experiment.
Half of the participants began the task after receiving the following oral instructions: ‘‘Imagine that the screen in front of
you is a mirror. You will be shown brieﬂy an image of your face, in different sizes. Your task is to indicate as fast as possible, for each
picture, whether you think it is smaller or bigger than if it were your mirror reﬂection.’’
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front of a real mirror to the left of the screen and at the same distance from where the stimuli would appear on the screen
during the experiment (mirror exposure condition). Like the screen monitor, the mirror was vertically oriented, but had an
overall larger size. Participants were then explicitly told to examine the size of their reﬂection. Thus, by this procedure, the
correct answer for the size-estimation task to follow was revealed to half our participants before the experiment. After about
20 s of mirror exposure, the mirror was removed, the participant placed in front of the screen, and the practice trials started,
followed by the ﬁve experimental blocks. Participants responded with their right hand on a response-pad, using the index
ﬁnger for ‘‘smaller’’ and the middle-ﬁnger for ‘‘bigger’’.
Trials for which the reaction time exceeded the mean plus 3 standard deviations were discarded from the analysis (0.9%
loss). Inspection of the data for the most extreme ranges of stimuli (30–40% and 140–150%) revealed no response errors (i.e.
‘‘bigger’’ for the smaller stimuli or ‘‘smaller’’ for the larger stimuli). To determine the point of subjective ambiguity in esti-
mating the size of own face reﬂection, we analyzed the variable image size as a function of the proportion of ‘‘bigger’’ re-
sponses (size over-estimations). The point of subjective ambiguity is the value on the size axis for which the subject
would say in equal proportions that the image presented was ‘‘smaller’’ or ‘‘bigger’’. To obtain this value, we ﬁtted a sigmoid
psychometric function to the data points using the least-squares regression (Matlab 7.6, MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA; see
Lopez, Bachofner, Mercier, & Blanke, 2009 for a similar approach). For statistical analysis, this value was determined inde-
pendently for reversed and non-reversed pictures and for each participant, and then entered in a repeated measures ANOVA,
with one within factor (Orientation: mirror reversed; nonreversed) and one between factor (Mirror Exposure: exposure; no
exposure).
2.2. Results and discussion
The average estimated reﬂection size across conditions was 90.1% (SD: 20.5%), thus larger than the physically correct mir-
ror reﬂection size of 50%. Overestimation was less pronounced in the mirror exposure conditions (76.8%; SD: 19.0%) com-
pared to when subjects were not allowed to see their face in a mirror before the task (103.4%; SD: 12.6%; Fig. 2A). This
difference was signiﬁcant (main effect of Mirror Exposure; F(1, 14) = 10.86, p < .01, g2p ¼ :43). We also found that mirror
reversal signiﬁcantly decreased overestimation (mirror reversed: 89%; SD: 20.2%; nonreversed: 91.2%; SD: 21.3%;
F(1, 14) = 16.16, p < .01, g2p ¼ :53; Fig. 2B). The interaction term did not reach signiﬁcance (F(1, 14) = 4.35, p = .09). Size esti-
mations for all conditions were signiﬁcantly different from the correct answer of 50% (T-tests for single means, all p < .01).
However, size estimations in the Mirror Exposure condition were signiﬁcantly different from 100% (mirror reversed:
t7 = 3.61, p < .01; nonreversed: t7 = 3.29, p = .01), showing that the overestimation bias in this condition was not imput-
able to a general tendency to estimate the actual size of one’s face. In the no exposure condition, size estimations were not
different from 100% (mirror reversed: t7 = 0.41, p = .68; nonreversed: t7 = 1.08, p < .31). Post experiment debrieﬁng revealed
that participants were not aware of the aims of the experiment. Only one participant realized that there were two sets of
pictures with different orientations.
Results of experiment 1 are in line with previous observations that people grossly overestimate the size of their own
reﬂection (Lawson & Bertamini, 2006). Despite different estimating methods and experimental conditions, the overestima-
tion magnitude that we obtained is similar to previously published data, i.e. closer to the size of the physical face (100%) than
to the correct mirror reﬂection size (50%). Our ﬁnding that direct exposure to an actual mirror reduced the overestimation
bias (from 103.4% to 76.8%), although without eliminating it, is also comparable with data by Lawson and Bertamini (2006)
where mirror exposure reduced overestimation from 106% to 85%. Thus, in the present and previous work, exposure to aFig. 2. Mirror exposure and left–right reversal modulate overestimation. (a) When participants were exposed to a mirror before performing size
estimations (mirror exposure), overestimation of the mirror-reﬂection was strongly reduced. (b) Left–right reversed faces were subjectively estimated as
smaller than nonreversed ones. Error bars represent standard errors.
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that participants in the Mirror Exposure condition did not use a strategy of visually comparing the respective face sizes as
seen in the mirror (during the mirror exposure procedure) with the size on the computer screen in order to perform the size
estimation task. This is also unlikely because the mirror and computer screen were not the same size, and the faces were
displayed too shortly to reasonably allow participants to examine, for instance, the distance between the displayed face
and the edge of the screen. Moreover, no such strategy could explain the pattern of our results in terms of face reversal. In-
deed, we found that the overestimation bias can be modulated by the orientation of the image. In the mirror reversed con-
dition, the reﬂection size of one’s own face was estimated slightly, but signiﬁcantly more accurately (i.e. less strongly
overestimated). This effect persisted even in the mirror exposure condition, revealing its robustness.
This effect of mirror reversal is compatible with the higher visual familiarity with the mirror-reversed face and previous
studies showing that the frequent use of mirrors in everyday life increases familiarity with one’s mirror reversed face as
compared to non-reversed pictures of one’s own face (Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986). In addition to this higher familiarity,
we further suggest that left–right reversal of one’s own face may also decrease the tendency to perceive planar projections in
mirrors as 3D objects and allows to better access the projected size rather than physical size of one’s own face. Conversely,
less familiarity with one’s nonreversed face may increase the tendency to perceive it as a spatially distant object, and thus
hinder access to its projected size.
In experiment 2 we explored the mirror reversal effect in a different group of participants and tested whether it is self-
face speciﬁc. For this we compared mirror face size estimation of the observer’s own face with that of another highly familiar
face, that of a close friend. Because the face of a friend is highly overlearned in the non-reversed orientation, but arguably
seldom observed as mirror-reversed, we predicted that the magnitude of overestimation for the self-face and other-face




Fifteen healthy participants (six female and nine male, two left-handed) took part in experiment 2 (mean age ± SD:
20.7 ± 1.0 years). All participants had normal vision and none reported a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. They
were tested in sets of two (one set of three), each participant knowing the other person for four to 15 years (mean ± SD:
3.6 ± 4.3 years). The sets were equally distributed across gender. We tested two male–female pairs, two female–female pairs
and four male-male pairs (with two male participants paired with a single third male, who performed the experiment only
once). Hence, each participant could be presented with stimuli of their own face (Self condition) and stimuli of a person
familiar to them (Other condition). Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their inclusion in the study.
They received ﬁnancial compensation for their participation.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Stimulus acquisition was the same as in experiment 1. Each image presented in the Other condition was scaled with re-
spect to the participant’s own head size (i.e. pictures in the Self and Other condition were all matched for size, 100% corre-
sponding to the head size of the participant). In absolute terms, the average magnitude of this normalization process was
1.2 cm ± 1.0 SD in height (mean head length: 21.6 cm ± 1.73 SD; maximum difference found in a pair: 2.5 cm; minimal dif-
ference: 0 cm).
The experimental setup was identical to that in experiment 1 except for the following. In study 1, each size was presented
an equal number of times. In order to avoid extreme contrasts between subsequent image sizes and to obtain more trials for
calculating the relevant range of the psychometric function (thereby also testing whether the reversal effect persists despite
methodological variations), we adapted the image size distribution. Each block comprised one presentation of the sizes 30%,
40%, 140%, and 150%, two presentations of the sizes 50% and 130%, three presentations of the sizes 60% and 120% and four
presentations for the sizes 65%, 70% , . . . 110%, 115% (only this range comprised pictures scaled in steps of 5%).
One person of each pair started with the Self condition and was given the same instructions as in experiment 1. The other
participant of the pair started with the Other condition and was given the same instructions, with the following addition:
‘‘(. . .) However, the face you will be shown is not your face, it is [friend’s name]’s face. So you will have to react as if you were
looking at a mirror and saw the face of your friend instead of your own face. Please perform the task as if you were looking at your
own face in a mirror.’’
Each condition included four blocks of 116 trials each (total: 464 trials for each condition, 928 for both). After the ﬁrst
condition had been performed, the experimenter explained the second condition. The repeated measures ANOVA included
the two within-subjects variables Identity (self; other) and Orientation (mirror reversed; nonreversed).
3.2. Results and discussion
The data of experiment 2 reveal that the effect of mirror reversal on face size overestimation depends on the identity of
the face whose reﬂection’s size is being estimated. Whereas mirror reversed own faces were on average estimated as smaller
Fig. 3. Facial identity affects overestimation. Identity of the perceived face differentially inﬂuenced size estimation as a function of face orientation. Left–
right reversal decreased the overestimation bias for self-faces, whereas it increased overestimation for another familiar person’s face. Error bars represent
standard error.
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ence of familiarity on reﬂection size estimation. Similar to experiment 1, the average estimated reﬂection size across condi-
tions was larger than the actual mirror reﬂection size (90.4%; SD: 11.2%). As predicted, we found that mirror size estimation
depends differently on left–right reversal for the own versus other’s face. The signiﬁcant interaction between Identity and
Orientation (F(1, 14) = 4.63, p < .05, g2p ¼ :25) was caused by a signiﬁcant difference between the value for Self mirror re-
versed (89.65%; SD: 9.4%) and Other mirror reversed images (91.35%; SD: 12.6%; Fisher least signiﬁcant difference test;
p = .035; all other p > .1; Fig. 3). There were no signiﬁcant differences depending on Identity (Self: 90.1%; SD: 9.8%; Other:
90.7%; SD: 12.5%; p = .8) or Orientation (Nonreversed: 90.1%; SD: 10.7%; Mirror reversed: 90.36%; SD: 11.5%; p = .8). The de-
crease in size estimation for mirror reversed self faces (as found in experiment 1) was found in nine out of 15 participants in
experiment 2, but failed to reach signiﬁcance. The opposite, non-signiﬁcant, effect was found in the Other condition (in nine
out of 15 subjects). Size estimations for all conditions were signiﬁcantly different from the correct answer of 50% (all p < .01)
and also from 100% (all p < .05). Post experimental debrieﬁng conﬁrmed that participants were unaware of the aims of the
study and only three participants noticed that the stimuli were either non-reversed or mirror-reversed.
Behavioral evidence has shown that left–right reversal differentially inﬂuences the perceived familiarity of one’s own face
and that of another person’s face (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2005; Brédart, 2003; Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986).
Whereas mirror reversed self faces are perceived as more familiar than non mirror-reversed ones, the opposite is true for
other (familiar) persons’ faces. Our data extend these ﬁndings by showing that these self-other differences with respect
to face stimuli are also present for mirror size estimation. The observed effect cannot be accounted for by differences in
the size of the faces of our participants: test face sizes were tailored for each participant by matching the size of the other
face to that of the self face. In addition, size differences were minimal and counterbalanced within pairs, and were irrelevant
to the reversal effect under study. We interpret the interaction between orientation and identity as the result of a differential
impact of reversal on facial familiarity: whereas one’s own face is frequently perceived as left–right reversed through reﬂec-
tions and as nonreversed through pictures or videos, faces of familiar persons are arguably much rarely seen in reversed
orientation.
4. General discussion
We conducted two experiments to investigate the size overestimation bias of mirror reﬂected faces using a new method.
We (1) replicated the observation that people massively overestimate the size of their mirror-reﬂected face and (2) showed
that the magnitude of overestimation can be reduced following a brief mirror exposure. We also (3) found that mirror left–
right reversal modulates the overestimation bias and that (4) this depends on the face’s identity. In what follows, we discuss
these results with respect to own face perception and the special role of the own face among visual objects.
In previous work, size estimation of participants’ reﬂected face was tested through a variety of methods including direct
questioning, drawing the outline of one’s imagined reﬂection on a mock mirror, matching paper ellipses of different sizes to
the estimated size of one’s reﬂection, verbal estimations expressed in centimeters, or direct measurements on a real mirror
(Bertamini & Parks, 2005; Lawson & Bertamini, 2006). Here we developed a procedure that allowed us to quantify psycho-
physically the magnitude of mirror size estimation. In order to test the subjective estimation of the size of the face reﬂection
we asked our participants to imagine that a computer screen in front of them was a mirror and collected repeated measures.
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varying the range of presented sizes and altering the familiarity of the displayed faces by modifying their orientation and/or
identity.
The present setup revealed magnitudes that are in the same range as previous data using other approaches, suggesting
that the present setting is a valid method to investigate mirror perception and cognition. Concerning the effects of prior mir-
ror exposure, our paradigm also allowed to replicate the ﬁnding that exposure to a real mirror reduces the magnitude of mir-
ror size overestimation (Lawson & Bertamini, 2006). Moreover, all participants were incredulous when they were shown,
after our experiments, the correct size for their own face reﬂection (Gombrich, 1960; Parks, 2001). These results support
Lawson and Bertamini’s (2006; see also Lawson et al., 2007) mixed account of the overestimation bias in terms of mainly
perceptual factors and additional factors inﬂuencing (although not eliminating) the bias. These authors proposed that the
bias is due to perceptual size constancy for objects (i.e. just as distant objects are perceived as larger than their retinal size,
the size of objects as they appear on reﬂecting surfaces is overestimated; Lawson et al., 2007). However, this strong overes-
timation bias can itself be modulated by direct interaction with a mirror or familiarity with the standard size of the reﬂected
object (Lawson & Bertamini, 2006).
A newmodulating factor that we report here for the ﬁrst time is the left–right orientation of the reﬂected face. Despite the
fact that participants were not informed about the variation of orientation of the displayed faces, we found that they judged
their mirror reversed face, i.e. the face as seen regularly in mirrors, as smaller (thus closer to the correct size) than the non
mirror-reversed one. This effect persisted even when the size overestimation was generally reduced when participants
where exposed to their reﬂection in a real mirror prior to the experiment. These ﬁndings show that the magnitude of the
size overestimation bias of mirror reﬂections decreases after mirror image interactions (Lawson & Bertamini, 2006), but also
that the effect of mirror-reversal is not abolished by this interaction and likely arises due to different mechanisms. The role of
mirror-reversal for highly familiar faces has previously been addressed (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2004; Brady et al.,
2005; Brédart, 2003; Mita et al., 1977; Rhodes, 1986; Smith, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2008) in explicit tasks requiring face
recognition, judgments of orientation and judgments of ‘‘likeliness’’ of mirror reversed versus normally oriented faces. These
studies, however, remained at the explicit level and only studied a limited number of trials. Our data demonstrate implicit
effects of left–right mirror reversal by asking participants to estimate the size of mirror reﬂections across a large number of
trials rather than explicitly judging the familiarity or identity of faces. Experiment 1 showed that size estimation is inﬂu-
enced by mirror reversal of one’s own face, and experiment 2 that mirror reversal differentially affects size estimation for
self and other faces.
The effect of mirror-reversal cannot solely be accounted for by mechanisms related to size constancy (Lawson & Berta-
mini, 2006; Lawson et al., 2007), as changes in left–right orientation or self versus other face kept the size of the visual object
constant. Accordingly, we argue that in addition to mechanisms related to size constancy, the overestimation bias of one’s
face reﬂection also depends on mechanisms related to visual specular familiarity. The own face and how we perceive it
visually is not like any other object. In addition to being a highly overlearned and familiar conﬁgural visual object (Tong
& Nakayama, 1999), it is a rich source of multimodal inputs. From a very early age, humans are able to match visual infor-
mation to sensorimotor processes related to the face (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). Recent experiments have shown that the per-
ception of tactile stimuli on one’s face can be modulated by concurrent visual touches delivered to a picture of one’s own face
(e.g. Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009; Serino, Pizzoferrato, & Làdavas, 2008), and conversely that visual self-recognition
can be modulated by the level of congruency of seen and felt tactile facial inputs (Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert,
2010; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tsakiris, 2009). Likewise, increased proprioceptive awareness of one’s own
head and inwardly focusing on one’s own breathing were associated, respectively, with improved size estimation of one’s
own head (Bianchi, Savardi, & Bertamini, 2008) and faster discrimination of mirror reversed self faces (Smith et al., 2008).
It is thus likely that visual self-face perception is closely associated to processes of bodily self-consciousness such as self-
location, self-identiﬁcation, and the ﬁrst-person perspective (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). Such processes might actually be
differently engaged as a function of the orientation of the perceived face. In this respect, it is interesting to note that
individuals with mirror-touch synesthesia – a condition where observing a touch applied to another person induces a tactile
sensation on one’s own body – can be segregated in a ‘‘specular’’ group (those who feel touch on the contralateral side than
the observed model, as if looking at a mirror) and a less frequent ‘‘anatomical’’ group (those who feel touch on the ipsilateral
side than the observed model, as if they were in the model’s shoes) (Banissy, Cohen Kadosh, Maus, Walsh, & Ward, 2009;
Banissy & Ward, 2007). These authors argued that this ‘‘specular bias’’ is likely related to ‘‘the fact that one’s own head is
only ever seen from a mirror-reﬂected perspective’’ (Banissy et al., 2009, p. 266). The present results further predict that
these synaesthetes may yield different behavioral and phenomenological results were they to observe their own face being
touched while displayed in reversed or non-reversed orientation. More generally, we believe that mirror reversal is an
important factor to take into account in studies using self-face stimuli, as non-trivial differences in visual processing, affec-
tive evaluation and multisensory integration might emerge according to whether the faces displayed were mirror-reversed
or not. Thus, our results are of relevance to the methodology and interpretation of the numerous studies using self-faces to
investigate self-consciousness, social cognition and the self.
To summarize, the present work highlights the importance of taking into account how faces are presented in studies of
mirror cognition and research using self-face stimuli (i.e., did experimenters use a reversed or a nonreversed picture?).
Where previous work already noted the difference in familiarity between left–right reversed and nonreversed faces, we re-
port here a much subtler inﬂuence of left–right reversal, namely its modulating effect on the overestimation bias of mirror
S. Dieguez et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011) 1452–1459 1459reﬂections. We suggest that this ﬁnding underlines the fact that perceiving one’s own face in the mirror involves not only
visual processes, but also processes related to multisensory and sensorimotor signals that reinforce along the years our
familiarity with our own left–right reversed face. Our ﬁndings also draw attention on the methodological and theoretical
importance of left–right reversal in self-face processing. Studies failing to control for this orientation factor might create con-
founds based on the assumed familiarity of the displayed face to its owner. Indeed, our ﬁndings suggest that non-reversed
familiar faces of friends or celebrities might actually be more familiar than non-reversed self-faces, thereby mitigating their
reliability as a control for familiarity.
In conclusion, seeing parts of one’s own body in the mirror, such as the face, trunk, or the hands, may differ in important
ways from the perception of non-bodily objects and the bodies of others. The comparative study of such different visual ob-
jects may not only allow us to gain insight about human mirror perception and the self, but also about spatial perception of
visual stimuli on planar and reﬂecting surfaces.
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